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| Titel | Foreclosure and tunneling with partial vertical ownership |
| Verantwortlich | Matthias Hunold, Vasilisa Petrishcheva |
| Autor/in |
Hunold, Matthias
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Werner, Vasilisa
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| Medientyp | Print |
| Publikationstyp | Buch |
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Erschienen
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2022
Düsseldorf, Germany
Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
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| Inhalt | We study the incentives of firms that hold partial vertical ownership to foreclose rivals. Compared to a full vertical merger, with partial ownership, a firm may obtain only part of the target's profit but may nevertheless be able to influence the target's strategy significantly. The target may be either a supplier or a customer, which opens the scope for either input foreclosure or customer foreclosure. We show that the incentives to foreclose can be higher, equal, or even lower with partial ownership than with a vertical merger, depending on how the protection of minority shareholders and transfer price regulations are specified. |
| ISBN | 9783863043902 | 3863043901 |
| Umfang | 47 Seiten |
| Erschienen als | DICE discussion paper, Band no 391 |
| Parallelausgabe |
Online-Ausgabe
ISBN:
9783863043902 |
3863043901
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